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Abstract: In this essay I present a survey of the literature on social capital and I stress that 
‘social capitalists’ tend to view underdevelopment mainly as a problem of collective action.  
Although I do not deny the importance of the latter in solving the development puzzle, I 
believe that social capital is not the way forward when trying to generate economic growth.  I 
argue this based on the following: 1) it is not clear what it is meant by social capital; it is a 
vague and confusing concept, and 2) I believe that the role of the State, power relations, 
politics, international factors and even geography remain as the key factors to understand why 
some countries/regions develop and some others remain underdeveloped.  To construct my 
argument  I rely on some of the very same works in which it is argued that social capital is the 
answer to underdevelopment, and I show that what the authors of these works are really 
saying, although they do not seem to acknowledge it and insist instead on the relevance of 
social capital, is that the factors I have pointed out above are the ones we should concentrate 
on when trying to generate economic growth.  However, this does not mean that the social 
capital concept should be done away with: if by development one means the creation and the 
distribution of wealth (‘social capitalist’ assume development is the same as the generation of 
wealth and nothing else) then social capital can become relevant if by it one means solidarity, 






The recent development studies literature reveals that social capital seems to be on its way to 
become the dominant paradigm in development.  In this essay, however, I will argue that 
social capital is not the answer to underdevelopment problems.   
‘Social capitalists’ suggest that underdevelopment should be considered as a problem 
of collective action.  Although I do not deny the role of the latter when referring to 
development problems, I believe that politics, the State, geography, power relations, 
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international factors, good governance and class conflicts remain as the keys to understanding 
the underdevelopment puzzle.  
 First, I will try to figure out what is meant by social capital (there are many 
definitions) and I will explain why social capital has become a useful concept in the 
development literature. Second, I will point out the flaws I find in social capital as an 
analytical tool and I will explain why I believe it is not the answer to underdevelopment 
problems.  Third, I will present a few case studies of successful development and which have 
been incorporated into the development literature as examples of how social capital leads to 
development.  Based on the very same evidence presented by the authors of these case 
studies, I will argue that it is not social capital what explains economic success in these 
experiences but one or many of the different variables I believe of importance in development 
issues (see above).  Fourth, I will submit that by social capital it should be meant solidarity, in 
which case then it becomes useful in solving underdevelopment. Finally, conclusions will be 
drawn. 
 
I. What is social capital? 
 
“Social capital, while not all things to all people, is many things to many people” (Narayan 
and Pritchett 1999:871).   That is, there are many definitions of social capital. Woolcock and 
Narayan1 (2000:229) identify 9 fields in which social capital has been utilized: “families and 
youth behaviour; schooling and education; community life (virtual and civic); work and 
organizations; democracy and governance; collective action; public health and environment; 
crime and violence; and economic development”.  I will concentrate on economic 
development.  Now I present the relevant definitions. 
 First, according to Putnam, the notion of social capital can be attributed to James 
Coleman.  It means the “norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement” which exist 
in a community and facilitate spontaneous cooperation (Putnam 1993:167).  Putnam 
emphasises that “horizontally ordered groups (like sports clubs, cooperatives, mutual aid 
societies and cultural associations) should be positively associated with good government 
[and economic development]” (Ibid.: 175 and chapter 6).  Social capital is productive: 
“Physical capital and human capital facilitate productive activity, and social capital does so 
                                                 
1 These authors argue that  there are four views to social capital in economic development:  communitarian, 
networks, institutional, and synergy. I reject this typology because, when trying to define social capital, I found it 
more useful to simply present the various definitions I came across with in the literature.   
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as well” (James Coleman, quoted in Petro 2001:230, emphasis added.  See also, Fine 
2001:102). 
Second, to Fukuyama, social capital is “…the component of human capital that allows 
members of a given society to trust one another and cooperate in the formation of new groups 
and associations” (1995:90, emphasis added).  Lyon (2000:664) also stresses that social 
capital means trust, and that such trust implies cooperation among economic agents.  Petro 
(op. cit.: 230) argues too that social capital means trust. 
Third, Fox (1996:1089) claims that social capital can be defined as autonomous civil 
society, “organizations that can represent diverse societal interests”.  Hyden (1997:27) also 
finds a relationship between social capital and civil society: “[c]ivil society is needed…to 
cater for those whose place at the state table is not reserved…it encourages people to act 
autonomously to achieve their goals, thereby contributing to the creation of social capital”. 
Fourth, for Uphoff and Wijayaratna, social capital means roles, procedures, rules, 
social networks, norms, attitudes, values and beliefs “that predispose people to 
cooperate…the benefit that we find most generally associated with social capital is mutually 
beneficial collective action…” (2000:1876).   
Fifth, for the World Bank, “[s]ocial capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and 
norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing 
evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for 
development to be sustainable.” (World Bank website).   
The concept of social capital then, in economic development, embraces at least the 
following categories: institutions, networks, trust, social norms and rules, attitudes and 
beliefs, associational life, civil society (organizations) and social cohesion.  One of the main 
premises of the concept is that “economic effects arise out of non-economic factors” (Fine 
op.cit.:16).  From the definitions above, the importance ‘social capitalists’ attach to collective 
action should be evident.  I will try to show that this latter point is of great relevance for it 
implies that ‘social capitalists’ consider underdevelopment as a problem of collective action 
(see, Brown and Ashman 1996). I submit that defining underdevelopment in such a way is the 
major weakness of the social capital concept.  I do believe collective action to be important, 
however, underdevelopment is not only solved through harmonious collective cooperation.  
This flaw, along with the ones I will mention below, constitute the basis to argue that social 




I.I The ‘usefulness’ of social capital 
 
Social capital is ‘useful’ because it works for its supporters as “the residual explanation for 
poverty after everything else has been taken into account” (Fine op.cit.:122, emphasis added).  
That is, when economic tools (neo-classical tools) fail to explain certain economic phenomena 
then social capital is introduced as the true and final explanation to them.     
Another reason why social capital has emerged as ‘useful’, particularly for the World 
Bank, is because it allows the latter to keep on not responding to the important contributions 
of the developmental state literature (critics against the Washington consensus). Thanks to 
social capital, the World Bank has ‘incorporated’ those critics into its new policy 
recommendations (post Washington consensus2) but, at the same time, the Bank “[continues] 
with most of its practices and prejudices which include the benign neglect of macro-relations 
of power, preference for favoured NGOs and grassroots movements…”(Fine 1999:12).  
Which leads to one more reason why social capital is ‘useful’:  by ignoring power relations, as 
well as class conflicts, politics, international factors, etcetera, the concept of social capital 
reduces underdevelopment to a technicality and ‘opens’ the door to success: if social capital 
will deliver development, create social capital! 
 
II. What is wrong with the concept of social capital? 
 
II.I A confusing concept  
 
One of the main premises of ‘social capitalists’ is that non-economic factors have economic 
consequences.  Fine (2001:25) argues that “…social capital is simply an oxymoron.  To be 
otherwise, there would have to be some sort of capital that is not social relative to which 
social capital has the potential to be distinctive.  As capital…is profoundly social and 
historical in content, this is not possible”.   Capital is social and there is no room for some 
kind of capital which is not, unless of course its social essence has been arbitrarily left out to 
begin with (Ibidem).  That is exactly what neo-classical economics did in the last 25 years or 
so, and that is why the concept of social capital (so much in vogue since the second half of the 
1990s) is “an explicit recognition of  adding society to an otherwise asocial economy” 
(Ibid.:26).   
                                                 
2More state and society-friendly than the previous consensus.  
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Social capital is then a kind of bringing society back in approach but in which the 
economy remains separated from society. That is why non-economic variables (social 
variables) have an impact on economic outcomes (which, I believe, are still being perceived 
as non-social).  The social becomes then one of the many independent variables that explain 
the dependent variable defined as economic performance.  This is misleading because 
economies, especially capitalist economies, are social: “capital is not a thing in the first place 
but is already social, global, exploitative, and embedded, to coin a phrase, in broader relations 
of which the state forms a part” (Fine 1999:16, emphasis added).  Economic performance 
under capitalism is also related to power relations, stratification, class conflict, tensions over 
resources and, of course, politics (Harriss and Renzio 1997:927, Fine 2001:92).  Economies 
are social, capital is social, social capital emerges then as a vague and confusing concept.  
How could social capital be considered as the answer to underdevelopment if one does not 
even know for sure what is meant by it?  Can one rely on an analytical tool that does not 
consider the economic as social? 
 
II.II A circular concept 
 
It is not clear whether social capital leads to collective action, efficient government and 
economic development, or collective action, efficient government and economic development 
lead to the creation of social capital.  The argument, in Putnam’s work, is circular: “‘norms of 
generalized reciprocity’ and ‘networks of civic engagement’ give rise to social capital which 
in turn makes cooperation between people possible, and reinforces reciprocity and civic 
engagement.  How the problems of collective action which constrain reciprocity and civic 
engagement are overcome in the firs place is a problem which not really addressed [sic]” 
(Harriss and De Renzio op. cit.: 924).  It is not obvious either how the networks of civic 
engagement lead to effective government (Ibidem). 
 
II.III  A misleading concept  
 
Social capital is a vague and confusing concept, hence, it is also misleading.  This is because 
those who do not see the inherent flaws in social capital as an analytical tool address the 
underdevelopment problem without taking into account, paradoxically, the social aspects of 
the process of development such as politics, class conflicts and power relations (among 
others), and concentrate too much in collective action.  Putnam, for example, argues that if 
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one wants to make democracy and capitalism work, one needs to build social capital, which in 
turn will lead to spontaneous cooperation (Op.cit.:chapter 6). Following Putnam himself, 
building social capital would mean creating “horizontally ordered groups (like sports clubs, 
cooperatives, mutual aid societies, cultural associations, and voluntary unions)” (Ibid.:175).  
But, are these kind of associations really relevant for economic growth?   
Grote points out that Putnam may have taken “too literally” some of the messages 
delivered by de Tocqueville in Democracy in America, “[f]or example, it is not said [in 
Democracy in America] that an association which ‘counts its supporters and involves them in 
a cause’ (de Tocqueville; quoted from Putnam; p.90, emphasis added by Grote) must 
necessarily be a soccer club, even if such a group ‘unites the energies of divergent minds and 
vigorously directs them toward a clearly indicated goal’.  Yet, Putnam is very explicit in that 
respect” (Grote 1997:5).  Grote is right in doubting that soccer clubs are the kind of 
associations de Tocqueville had in mind: “[i]n the United States associations are established 
to promote the public safety, commerce, industry, morality, and religion” (de Tocqueville 
1994:192). If it is assumed that building social capital is the answer to underdevelopment, one 
may end up with a lot of bird watching societies whose members are poor and 
undernourished.  
As mentioned above, for some ‘social capitalists’ the most important attribute of social 
capital is trust.  “Trust can dramatically reduce what economists call transaction costs –costs 
of negotiation, enforcement, and the like– and makes possible certain efficient forms of 
economic organization that otherwise would be encumbered by extensive rules, contracts, 
litigation, and bureaucracy” (Fukuyama, op. cit.: 90).  Lyon also considers trust as relevant, 
“…trust is necessary for the development of a vibrant private sector based on 
microenterprises, in conditions where actors cannot rely on formal legal institutions at 
present” (Op. cit.:663, emphasis added). It seems then that trust is conceived by ‘social 
capitalists’ as a substitute for the State (in its form of legal institutions).   
But this necessarily means that trust remains as a second best, that is why it arises as 
necessary ‘in conditions where actors cannot rely on formal legal institutions’. The 
Hobbesian-Smithean solution to the functioning of society still holds in place: the State is of 
first importance (in this case, to promote efficient economic action by ensuring contracts 
among actors). Following Harriss and De Renzio, I do not claim that “…‘features of social 
organization, such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation’ 
are unimportant, but that they are actually very powerfully influenced by political institutions, 
including state institutions.  Development interventions which are aimed at ‘creating social 
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capital’, therefore –as for example, in programmes of support for associations in civil society– 
could miss the mark” (Op. cit.:928, emphasis added). 
 Social capital is then a misleading concept because it can be understood as a substitute 
of the State (minimizing the role of the latter in economic development) and because it 
focuses too much in collective action while ignoring, as I have already said, the social aspects 
of development.  This is why “…policy arguments which pose civil society against the state, 
or which rest on the view that rich endowment in ‘social capital’ is a precondition of ‘good 
government’, are almost certainly misconceived” (Ibid.:919). 
 
III. Case studies: ‘creating’ social capital 
 
If social capital is to be the answer to underdevelopment problems, it must then play the role 
of an independent variable, that is, social capital should be considered as X when 
development is Y. However, as pointed out above, it is not really clear whether social capital 
leads to economic growth or vice versa.  As a matter of fact, “...[the] distinction between  
what causes social capital and what it actually is, cannot be made.” (Lyon, op. cit.:664).  Even 
though it is not possible to clearly identify what causes social capital, there are several authors 
who claim it is possible to build the latter and, in this way, fight underdevelopment (Lyon op. 
cit.; Heller 1996; Uphoff and Wijayaratna op. cit.; Fox, op.cit; Petro, op. cit; Brown and 
Ashman, op. cit.).   
I believe this type of works share a common flaw: their authors claim that creating 
social capital leads to economic growth, hence, they propose that efforts should be made at 
building more and more social capital (the latter becomes and end and not a means).  But a 
closer look at these studies reveals that, in any case, what these authors label as social capital 
arises as a result of economic development which, in turn, has been achieved following the 
strategies which are widely recognized as conducive to economic growth: improving 
government (role of the State), land reform, providing more resources to more people, 
changing the political environment in favour of capital (investments), etcetera. I submit that 
those who claim more efforts should be made at building social capital are missing the 
picture.  I suggest that more efforts should be made at developing good government, security, 
infrastructure, changing power relations in favour of those who have the least access to 
resources, etcetera.   
If as a result of the proposed measures economic growth is produced but along with it 
a stronger civil society arises and more soccer clubs are founded I would not complain, 
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however, this would mean that social capital stops being an independent variable which 
determines economic growth and becomes a dependent variable determined by the latter. The 
answer to underdevelopment problems is not social capital but growth.3  When these authors 
claim that there is a need to build more social capital, what they are actually claiming for is 
more economic growth (and more democracy), and when they say that it is possible to build 
social capital they are actually saying that it is possible to build economic growth.  I simply 
do not understand why they do not recognize so and insist on the social capital concept 
(maybe they do so as a way to have an excuse in case of economic failure).  In the following 
paragraphs, I will be concentrating on all of the critiques I have held regarding social capital 
so far. 
Lyon (Op.cit.) concentrates on the creation of social capital in Ghana’s agricultural 
economies. He argues that social capital (in the form of trust in the absence of a legal 
framework actors can rely on) can be built through relationships among traders and farmers.  
His conclusion is that “there is a wide range of circumstances where resource poor farmers 
and traders develop cooperation or draw on existing networks, allowing them to enter into 
new markets and increase incomes” (676). And the policy recommendation he comes up with 
(although he does not explain how a weak State which has not managed to provide a reliable 
legal framework will be capable of carrying out policy) is to create “[a] formal legal system 
that is more appropriate for microenterprises [which would] allow more time and resources to 
be put into building up other relationships and establishing new opportunities. It is also 
necessary to identify those who are excluded from networks that have the potential to lift 
them out of poverty, and those that are tied into networks or dependency relations that can be 
highly exploitative” (678).  If farmers and traders have developed a system based on trust to 
carry out their business, why ask for a formal legal framework? Because the author is not 
really convinced that social capital is the best answer to the problems faced by farmers in 
Ghana, instead, he goes back to basics and points out that a legal basis of law (provided by the 
State) is needed to secure economic interactions.  The State “emerges” as a fundamental actor 
in economic development, not social capital and not collective action either. 
Heller (Op. cit.) focuses on the creation of social capital in one of India’s states, 
Kerala, which “enjoys levels of social development that are decades in advance of the rest of 
the country” (1055).  Heller argues that “[b]y any account, [Kerala’s] developmental 
successes are tied to what are clearly exceptionally high levels of social capital” (1055).  And 
                                                 
3 Growth by itself will not lead to development.  What I mean is that to start solving underdevelopment growth is 
needed. 
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then he goes on to argue that Kerala has been successful because there was a radical land 
reform in the 1970s which “transformed the agrarian social-property structure, destroying the 
traditional landlord class and creating a new class of small proprietors…Moreover, even by 
Indian standards, the state has been very active in regulating the market, restricting labor-
displacing technologies in traditional industries, legislating work conditions and hiring 
practices as well as in agriculture and aggressively enforcing minimum wages” (1056).     
Even more interesting, Heller holds that “[t]he redistributive thrust of Kerala’s 
development has carried with it a direct attack on traditional structures of power as well as the 
prerogatives of capital.  It has as such entailed a fundamental realignment in the balance of 
class forces” (1057, emphasis added).  So far then, I do not see how social capital had 
anything to do with Kerala’s economic success.  But Heller insists that social capital is 
involved because in the 1970s Kerala’s workers experienced high levels of labour militancy 
which “adversely affected productivity growth and investment.  As industrial growth and 
employment stagnated, it became increasingly clear that militancy was exacting a too high a 
price” (1060).  In this case, although involved, social capital was not productive at all: it 
created stagnation.  Heller explains that the State had to step in and mediate between 
capitalists and workers and, in this way, industrial production recovered (1063).  Social 
capital does not seem to have a role at all in Kerala’s economic success although Heller insists 
that it does.  Based on the very same evidence presented in this study, I would argue that good 
governance and a shift in power relations is what determined Kerala’s economic growth in 
the last 20 years, and not social capital nor collective action (actually, collective action, as in 
Unions, was harmful).   Heller argues that social capital was there because he confuses 
economic development with social capital. 
Petro (Op. cit.), who looks at the creation of social capital (as trust) in the Novgorod 
region of Russia, is also a victim of this confusion: carefully explaining that the economic 
successes of this region were due to a good local administration (which in 1993 set up a fund 
to support small businesses initiatives, attracted foreign investment through ‘tax holidays’ and 
has carefully managed its budget (232)), he argues that social capital is crucial to 
understanding Novgorod good economic performance.  Why?  Because Petro believes that 
what the local administration in Novgorod was aiming at was creating social capital when it is 
obvious that it was aiming at creating economic growth.  “The experience of Novgorod 
reinforces the notion that governments will invest in the creation of social capital, if they see 
how they gain from it” (237). Petro takes his confusion between social capital and economic 
growth so far that he even makes it explicit: “[a]ccording to three of the most common 
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measures of social capital –economic development, trust in government, and civic activism– 
Novgorod seems to have developed an unusually high level of social capital” (237, emphasis 
added).  Is not this a tautology? Saying that economic development is a measure of social 
capital implies that poor countries should have low endowments of social capital and that rich 
countries should have large ones.  Which in turn leads to think that to be richer you need more 
social capital, but then again, richness is social capital. 
In this case, the explanation to success does not lie in social capital, it lies in good 
government, resources (foreign investment) and even geography for Novgorod is located 
between St Petersburg and Moscow, a position that makes it very attractive for investments 
aimed at food production and processing given the low transportation costs from the region to 
those two big cities (Ibid.:232).  Was Novgorod success just a matter of collective action? 
 Fox (Op. cit.) studies the creation of social capital (as civil society) in rural Mexico.  
He rejects Putnam’s notion of considering horizontal networks as social capital, but insists on 
social capital being the same as affluence, “[i]f this assumption were valid [Putnam’s], then 
many of Mexico’s poorest regions would be considered to have large stocks of social capital.  
They are covered with strong horizontal webs at the most local level.  Yet these are precisely 
the country’s poorest regions, with the worst systems of governance in terms of both process 
and performance” (1091).  Mexico’s poorest regions do have horizontal webs, but this is not 
considered as social capital because these regions are poor.  It seems then, again, that  social 
capital means richness.   
Fox defends the idea that social capital  is not only important for development but also 
for democracy (1096-1097).  And this is where I find another problem with social capital: 
social capital is not only confused with economic growth, but also with democracy.  Another 
tautology appears: in democratic countries there is a lot of social capital, and in non-
democratic ones there is very little.  If the latter wish to be democratic, they need to build 
social capital, but then again democracy is the same as social capital which leads me to say 
that if you want to build democracy…you simply need to build democracy! 
Looking at households, Maluccio et al (2000) demonstrate that social capital (as  
associations) has had a positive impact on income distribution (measured as expenditures) in 
South Africa’s largest province, KwaZulu-Natal.  They argue that “[o]n average, each 
household was a member of 0.8 groups in 1993 and this increased by 65% to 1.3 in 1998.  
Over the same period, the percentage of  households with at least one membership also 
increased from 55 to 71 percent” (63).  Three problems arise with this argument: 1) the 
authors do not make it explicit that they are working with real expenditures and not gross 
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ones; 2) some households did not improve their condition but actually became poorer, and 3) 
the authors point out that, during the same period they are studying, South Africa experienced 
important structural transformations which made investments more productive (77).  Hence, it 
is not clear whether households are spending more as a result of joining to more associations 
or because South Africa is simply doing better thanks to structural transformation. 
 
IV. Social capital as solidarity 
 
I have argued that social capital is not the way forward in solving underdevelopment.  
However, a clarification must be made: this statement is only valid because by development I 
have meant the creation of wealth, which is the meaning that all the works here presented, and 
economic theory in general, give too to the term development at least implicitly. In this case it 
is quite clear that social capital as collective action is not the only requirement to produce 
wealth and it is also clear that other factors or variables (like the ones I have mentioned along 
this work) are of great relevance.  However, if by development it is meant more than the 
creation of wealth, i.e., the equal or at least the not so unequal distribution of such wealth, 
then social capital can be a useful concept if by it one means solidarity.  Through social 
capital in the form of solidarity, which could be expressed through either income or goods 
transfers to those who need them, societies would be in a better position to achieve 
development if by the former one means creation and distribution of wealth. This does not 
imply that the variables we know can contribute to generate economic growth become 
irrelevant; solidarity would be useless if there is no wealth to be distributed.  The point is the 
following: social capital may not be relevant to generate economic growth, but it certainly 
could be of the most importance to distribute the richness generated by that growth (through 
solidarity).  Of course this is a topic that would require another essay (even many essays) to 





I have tried to show that social capital is not the answer to underdevelopment problems 
because, to begin with, it is a vague and confusing concept on which there is no consensus 
about its meaning.  However, what it is clear about social capital is that it handles the 
economy as external to the social.   
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Second, as it is frequently used, social capital puts excessive emphasis on the role of 
collective action in solving underdevelopment.  I do not, I repeat, I do not deny that collective 
action is important but to the extent it is privileged it leads to neglecting politics, power 
relations, institutions, resources, government action and efficacy, international factors, class 
conflict and even geography when dealing with economic growth.  My point is that, even if 
collective action is to be considered of great importance, all of the latter influence it. 
Third, not all ‘social capitalists’ neglect all of the above. When they take them into 
account, however, it is usually to show that by dealing with them development is possible 
(which is no surprise).  Nevertheless,  these ‘social capitalists’ do not claim so and, instead, 
they claim that social capital (and not growth) can be created, which leads to my next point. 
Fourth, ‘social capitalists’ tend to confuse development with social capital and, some 
times, even with democracy.  They propose policy should aim at building social capital but, 
based on their very same studies, I have tried to argue that this is misguided and that the old 
strategies to achieve development (role of the State, good governance, land reform, shift in 
power relations, foreign investment, etcetera) are still valid (see case studies again). 
Fifth, if social capital is to be considered as the solution to underdevelopment (as the 
World Bank currently claims) then it must take the position of an independent variable which 
should have an impact on the dependent variable defined as economic growth.  However, 
given the confusion outlined above, ‘social capitalists’ make social capital the dependent 
variable and terribly miss the point. 
Sixth, the social capital literature assumes that development is the same as the creation 
of wealth.  This essay has been constructed following such assumption and that is why I have 
been able to show that social capital is not the way forward to achieve development and that 
other factors must be taken into account when trying to generate economic growth.  However, 
if one assumes that by development it should be meant the generation and the distribution of 
wealth, then social capital can become useful if by it one means solidarity.  Personally, I 
believe the time has come to try to build a theory of social transformation based on human 
solidarity and benevolence. For instance, could capitalism survive in a world where 
individuals are not selfish? I do not think that trying to answer this question is a waste of time.  
After all, we are humans and we are capable of showing compassion and sympathy, not only 
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